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The Jurisdiction of the Areopagos in Homicide Cases* 
1. 
of the most significant discoveries in legal history during recent years is to 
credited to Michael Gagarin. thesis, amazingly simple, states that the time of 
Drakon, scarcely distinction between "premeditated" and "unpremeditated" homicide 
had made.1 Also quite plausible seems his view that the structure of Athenian 
homicide law had remained largely unchanged since the days of Drakon.2 In view of the 
important role oaths played in archaic procedure,3 it furthermore supposed that 
the five different homicide courts originated from early oath-places .4 these 
assumptions, however, it is hard to believe that the competence of the Areopagos in the 
age of the orators shotJ1d have based whether the defendant is accused of 
"premeditated" killing. This would require substantial alteration of Athenian homicide 
law. Such reform have taken place, we have direct knowledge of it. 
Presuming, however, the greatest possible continuity, the question arises whether our 
sources from the time of the orators have interpreted correctly so far: in other 
words, is really the criterion for the judicial competence of the 
Areopagos? 1 doubt it. 
the issue of the judicial competence of the Athenian courts for homicide there 
are authentic statements from the most distinguished authors of Greek classicalliterature: 
Demosthenes and Aristotle. In opinion, Plato has also commented, indirectly, 
that matter. Modern studies5 have paid a!:'propriate attention only to the first two authors 
mentioned-not to Plato. rather hypothetical contribution to the subject tries to 
separate the rules the competence of Athenian homicide courts from those 
determining the sanctions to imposed there. Or, more precisely: in determining the 
competence of the Areopagos, it could have relevant whether the perpetrator had 
• preliminary version, enlitled "Die ZustJindigkeil des anliken Areopags als 
Blulgerichtshor' (from 1987) will pubIished Athens in commemoralive volume for Ihe 150th 
anniversary of the Areios Pagos-hopefully withoul funher delay. the Symposion 
for the mOSI part complied with thal version. diseussion , however, has produced some new 
aspects, which 1 have partially included in the lexl, partially summarized in Additional NOle (below). 
In ftrsl 1 have 10 thank respondenl, Prof., Wallaee. 1 also indebled 10 Barth for his 
assislance in preparing the English lexl version and 10 eolleagues, Prof. Wallace and Prof. Gagarin, for 
revising responsibilily, of eourse, is 
1 Gagarin (1981) 60 and l1lff, followed Thtir (1985) 510-514 and (1990) 146f, rejected 
WaHaee 16f critical remarks listed there in see also 112-115). sophisticated 
differences between "premeditated" and "intentiona1" will tum out 10 insigniftcant investigation, 
cf. this matter recently Wallaee 98-100. 
2 Gagarin (1981) 22-29; however Sealcy 291-294. 
3 (1989) 57 and (1990) 151f. 
4 the othcr hand, Sealey 290 assumes gradual hislOrical development in three stages. 
5 Lipsius 12lff, Busolt-Swoboda 530ff and 81lff, MacDowell (1963) 44, Sealey 276f, N<Jrr 
(1983) 645-649, Wallaee 
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killed his own the sanctions inflicted in homicide trial, however, could 
have dependent whether the kil1ing was premeditated unpremeditated. 
f1rst sight, the ancient testimonia seem to show somewhat different picture. 
us begin with the report the homicide courts given Demosthenes 
in his speech delivered against Aristokrates in 352 (23.65-79). Only the council 
convening the Areios Pagos the court meeting the temple of Pallas Athene, the 
Palladion, are of interest us here (65-70, 71-73).6 Only the competence of the 
Palladion, viz. to hear cases of unpremeditated homicide, is reported the (71): 
6ru'tEPOV 'to 'trov <lKOUcrtroV . .. ,'tOU1tt ... 
corresponding statement, e.g. concerning is missing in 65-70 
which deal with the Areopagos; this description, however, the reader almost inevitably 
gets the impression that charges of premeditated kil1ing fell within the jurisdiction of the 
Areopagos. exact, however, 23.73 merely tells us in rather general terms that 
lesser degree of guilt causes less severe punishment.? 
Only single speech links the words with the 
Areopagos: Deinarchos, Against Demosthenes (1 .6; 323 this passage a1so 
mentions "kil1ing violence," indicating direct killing one ' s own Whether 
the f1rst term was to the i.e. the death penalty, and the other to the 
competence of the court, certainly decided the basis of this text alone. 
Anyway, in the context of his speech the orator had reason for giving more precise 
details . 
the other hand, premeditation as criterion for judicial competence of the 
Areopagos is clearly expressed in Aristotle's Politeia (57.3 ; 325 
Etcrt 'tprocrn, Ev 'APEtq> 
1t<lYq>, . .. 'trov <lKOUcrtroV OtKE-n,V 
01. What Demosthenes describes with conclusive clearness 
becomes blurred the material empirically gathered. The Palladion is said to 
competent for cases of 1) unpremeditated killing, 2) indirect killing,9 and 3) killing 
non-citizen. Remarkably, the latter two crimes committed either with without 
premeditation. the other hand, Demosthenes (23.71) is logically consistent in 
6 
advisable. 
7 
.. . 
In following, 1 will argue silentio so reading passages in contcxt wou ld 
23.73 : aKOUcr(rov ;] EKOUcr(rov 
8 Ocin. 1.6: f] 7tpOVO(W; 
rupEtv, 5tKao(Xt ljIuxfi<; jlEV 
7tapavojlov 5ta7tE7tpa'(jlEvou<; 
;] C"jlt&oat ... Wallace 98 draws from term 7tpovo(W; rather one-sided 
conclusions. 
9 The tcrm comprises more than "planning"; "planning or instigating," 
Gagarin (1990) 82, is an intcrprccation 100 narrow (see below notes 13 and 14). Gagarin (1990) quite 
properly shows-against (1963) it is correct to infer /)("'l in 
Athenian homicide law from ambiguous term as used Aristot!c; 
always led to 5("'l <pOvou . 
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referring solely to cases lacking premeditation. logical stringency is somewhat 
weak argument against apparently good evidence. More emphasis therefore should 
placed an inconsistency regarding the Areopagos. Aristotle, in the passage quoted 
varies the wording of law cited Demosthenes different occasion (23.22): 
'tiJv 'tiJv EV 1t<Xyq> <pOVO\) 1C<Xt 
fairly literal paraphrase of this provision is presented first glance-
possibIy influenced preconception raised the Athenaion Politeia- E1C in 
this law seems to refer to both and <povo\). it is equaBy possibIe to 
interpret as applying only to the second word, meaning "wounding with intent 
to With regard to phonos, then, would necessarily the relevant 
criterion the competence of the court. Both offenses, phonos as weB as could 
have element in the direct use of one's own hands. Phonos, originally, 
means killing violence and bIoodshed; 11 charges of that kind of phonos 
within the competence of the Areopagos, regardless of the perpetrator's intent. If the 
victim survives physical assault, he as plaintiff must additionaBy claim the perpetrator's 
intent to kill in order to try the case the Areopagos. in classical times the 
plaintiff proves 1tpovota to the the evidence of external circumstances: had the 
perpetrator, example, brought along knife did he merely use clay pot, 
incidentally grasped, to hurt his victim (Lys. 4.6). 
So the meaning of the law cited in Dem. 23.22 remains ambiguous. Anyway, it is 
certain that the Athenaion Politeia paraphrasing (av 
11 interprets the in sense according to which premeditation was 
the decisive criterion the competence of the Areopagos. Correspondingly, Aristotle 
also lists- fairly confusingly- the tenn aJ<:o\)otOOV of the competences of the 
Palladion. Modern scholars unanimously agree the view conveyed Aristotle: cases 
of homicide were to tried the Areopagos, those of unpremeditated 
killing the Pa\Iadion. 12 . 
Plato's Nomoi (written 350 will lead us different track. This 
work in does not describe the positive law of Athens, suppose that the 
philosopher has not left the frame of certain fundamental principles and ideas of the law 
of his native Therefore, closer look the structure of his chapter homicide 
offenses could instructive. There, basic classification the proposed Iegal 
10 Pollux 8.117: <pOvou ... , see 
Wallace 97. 
11 (1%3) 45, Wa11ace 106. 
12 Lipsius 123, 111, Rhodes 641, 642, Wallace 98, Heitsch (1989) 71, 
(1990) 82. Not Quite 10gically, (1963) 45, 66, finds and as 
criteria. Sea\ey sticks to conventiona1 view 277, 290 he comes Quite close to 
hypothesis with his "killing Athenian citizen intentiona11y with one's own hands." 
56 Gerhard 
regulations distinguishes between "killing one's own hand" and "killing not one 's 
own hand": a'iJ'tOXEtp a1t01C'tEtVlJ ... cf. also 
or 0<; ... a'i)'tOXEtp K1:Eiv!\, . .. and a'iJ'tOXEtp 
1:ft 
at1:to<; K6.eapo<;"t1,v 1:0\) Ev 
Although appearing antiquated, this scheme which is so easy to apply in 
sets framework within which the philosopher develops his highly sophisticated 
theory of guilt (which 1 will not deal with here). Consequently, for Plato the degree 
penalty in both cases is dependent upon the degree guilt and not upon extemal 
circumstances the deed. Any logically compelling reason for classifying homicide 
offenses according to exterior facts cannot perceived. Plato only permits the 
premeditating perpetrator who has not used his own hands to (as opposed to the one 
who did) to buried in his home land but this cannot have been the reason for 
extending the opposition aU1:OxEtp / over the entire chapter also 
U sing this distinction Plato apparently foHows differentiation 
Athenian legal practice. The philosopher, the one hand, refines the system 
sanctions in comparison with Athenian law. the other hand, he widely simplifies the 
sophisticated rules the competence ihe homicide courts. One make good 
argument that this differentiation, completely insignificant to him in substance, has been 
derived from Athenian regulations jurisdiction. The Nomoi therefore should 
encourage us to reconsider the confusing provisions competence the Athenaion 
Politeia provides for killing an Athenian citizen: possibly not lack premeditation 
but solely indirect action was the criterion crucial for assigning 
case to the Palladion. In consequence, the Areopagos should regarded as competent 
for cases "killing one's own hand" (aU1:0XEtp or similar terms). 
Consequently, we have to examine the evidence for the opposition XEip / 
in Athens' legal practice: Ant. 6.16 and IG 104.12; Arist. Ath. PoI. 39.5 and 
Andok. 1.94. four texts will tum out to connected with the competence the 
homicide courts. 
13 For quite plausible reasons the opposite, killing not ooo's own hands, is missing in Plato's 
passages killing unintentionally or in the heat of passion; theoretically, such situation look 
somewhat far-fetched. Antiphon (6.19), however, gives evidence of strange case of without 
Indeed, reaJ life seems to offer much more than phiJosophers or jurists commonJy are 10 
conceive. For in Ant. 6, see Maschke 92ff, (1963) 63f, NOrr (1983) 646; 
insufficiently Gagarin (198 1) 42, which see Heitsch (1984) 17, Thiir (! 985) 510; cf aIso l13f who 
takes as "prem&litation." 
14 In using the terms XEtp, and this passage obviously follows the law of 
DraI<on (as restored, see below, n.19). The schematic opposition reveaIs that the principaJ classification is 
based direct and indirect killing. literally tal<en, as AnL 6 shows, the term (10 plan, 10 
devise) does not cover each and every case of killing "without using one's own hands" (see Heitseh [1984] 
20, NOrr [1986] 76f); but this is due 10 DraI<on, not 10 Plato. With his paraphrase (purpose) and 
(plotting) thc philosopher particularJy emphasizes the interior facts of the deed. 
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1) his speech the Choreutes (412 Antiphon quotes passage from the 
wording of the the oaths to sworn both parties the preliminary 
proceedings (6.16): btroJ.LOcrav"to oU"tOt J.LEv J.LE Mobo"tov 
"tov 80:va"tov, qro apO:J.LEVo<; The 
plaintiff and his witnesses charged the speaker with killing but admitted 
that the accused had not acted (19). Fo11owing Aristotle (Ath . Pol. 57.3), the 
competence of the Palladion-the speech doubtless was held there- would have 
determined either of these two reasons. Remarkably enough, only the exterior aspect 
of committing the crime is afftrmed oath, but not the issue of guilt. Because of the 
absence of premeditation, the accused is not facing the death penalty , only 
banishment (6.4, 7; cf. 23.72). What sense could the plaintiff's have 
made under those circumstances? l! is reasonable to assume that the plaintiff' s pre-
procedural oath determined the competence of the Accordingly, and 
lack of premeditation have crucial for the jurisdiction of the 
Palladion. 
Like the accuser, the accused in his did remark the issue of 
guilt . denies killing "mit der Hand, die er darum geregt"1 6 as well as indirect 
homicide. The alternative cannot refer to difference in punishment;17 in Athenian 
law, there is indication of different penalties to imposed for killing one' s 
own hand and for killing not one's own hand. Whether homicide was to punished 
with death or exile was solely dependent whether the crime had committed with 
or without (Dem. 21.43). The altemative " with one's own hand or not" seems 
to refer to the competence, just like the plaintiff's does. With the jurisdiction of 
the Palladion already determined the term the of killing one 's 
own hand" seems to the appropriate criterion for the competence of the Areopagos. 
for what reason does the speaker in his oath deny both types of committing 
homicide, despite being accused of on1y As the defendant he is urgently interested 
in getting rid of the homicide charge and for lf acquitted, the comprehensive 
words of his oath protected him against further judicial challenge, matter if it 
should take place the Palladion or the Areopagos. Besides, he is fo11owing the law 
of Drakon, as will shown below. 
Realizing the central role the played in initiating homicide trials, the 
brief remarks in Antiphon 's sixth speech offer good reason to conclude as fol1ows 
the competency of the courts for charges of killing Athenian citizen: for cases of 
the Palladion, for cases of killing one's own hand the Areopagos; 
15 Thiir(1990) 151f. 
16 This is how Wilamowitz (1900) has translated the <ip<iI!EVO<;. this 
with Andok. 1.94 EpyaoaI!EV<X;. Dobree) is inappropriate for the antiquated wording of the 
oath; see however Heitseh (1980) 52 with doubts Gagarin (1990) 95. 
17 (1963) 66. Gagarin (1990) 95. 
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was only to sentencing. 
2) Also to the forrnulation of diomosiai is, in opinion, passage 
from Drakon's law homicide, of which 1 have suggested the following restoration18 
104.11-13): [ ... e[vClt XEtp1. 
The terrn here must interpreted as court 
decision "pronouncing judgment." It means the of authoritatively forrnulating the 
oaths that lead to final verdict.20 In accordance with the charge the plaintiff had 
forward, the basileis imposed him to swear that the accused was guilty21 of homicide 
either killing with his own hands participating. The plaintiff, of course, had to 
decide of the altemative charges; in his oath, the accused was to deny the 
accuser' s allegations.22 As already the time of Drakon direct and indirect killing had 
led to different oaths, so too the existence of d.ifferent oath-places might suggested 
accord.ingly. Thus already the seventh century might have known different court-places, 
long before the council of the Areopagos engaged in trying homicide cases, and 
before the introduction of an "element of guilt" into the homicide law.23 issue 
of already the time of Drakon, had mentioned only in connection with 
sanctions.24 
those were the early days. It is certain that the law of Drakon, of the 
inscription-unfortunately preserved only in condition-provides answer to 
questions the competence of certain courts. Looking those reports would in 
vain anyway. However, combining the text with Ant. 6 allows us to infer that xEip and 
as criteria the competence in accordance with the trad.iti.onal 
character of Athenian homicide law, traced back to the earliest times. 
3) It will also help us get better understanding of the two remaining texts if we 
interpret them as jurisdictional clauses. Excluded from the amnesty of 403/2 were 
homicide offenders (and those officials who were most incriminated), see Arist. Ath. Pol. 
39.5: 'to-u <p6vo'U E1vClt KCl'ta 1t<l'tptCl, Et 'tiC; 'ttVCl ii 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Thiir (1990) 152. 
Fonner restoration aUempts listed Lewis (/G 13); see aISO Thiir, ZSS 102 (1985) 776. 
Thiir (1989) and (1990) 152. 
As shown Ant. 6.17, also tenn supposedJy was included in wording 
22 Verdict was rendered simply vote of court two parties' opposite 
allegations (cf. Ant. 6.3, 16); see Thiir (1987) 478. 
23 In opinion, (1990) 149, 156, the of guilt, with death penalty, 
relevant only from Solon As early bistory of Areopagos see WaJJace 8-22. seems to 
right in pointing out in Drakon's time entire "council meeting Areios Pagos" (founded 
Solon), but only 51 ephelai judged homicide trials "solid rock" (as [213f] explains 
etymology of Areios Pagos). evidence (see following note), however, Wallace 
up jurisdicrional competence of this arcbaic court with 7tpOVoLa. 
24 this is clearly expressed in the ftrst sentence ofthe law of Drakon (/G 13 104.11): 
[7t]povo{[a]<; [KJt[ivEL q>eUY]E[V ', .. ]. Further probIems dealt with see 
Wallace 16ff, (1990) 145f. AJso the (1.17) refers to sanctions exile), to 
competences; see Thiir(199O) 146 
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Why is premeditation not to in this case? The that the law covers 
group of homicide offenders who had used their own hands suggests the existence of 
such category a1ready in homicide law. Obviously, the perpetrator who had used ''his 
own hands" appeared to more significant than the who had acted 
those were the cases belonging to the Areopagos.26 As the combination of killing and 
wounding plainly shows, the clause refers to this the word will certainly 
to the 'tpaVJla we have already met in Dem. 23.22. 
RemarkabIy, the text of the official document reported Aristotle omits the phrase 
while the s own hand," characterizing both offenses, precedes. 
The words Et au't6XEtp . . . therefore are to regarded as authentic 
interpretation of the law jurisdiction reported Demosthenes (23.22): offenses 
out with one's own hands within the competence of the Areopagos. 
Reference to "ancestral tradition" suggests the same results, as from the time of Drakon 
killing one's own hand had linked with certain particular oath- and court-places. 
So Aristotle, in placing the instead of au't6XEtp in front of the two 
verbs "killing" and "wounding" (Ath. Pol. 57.3), presents an report Athenian 
law. 
Completely different words are used in amnesty decree proposed 
Patrokleides in 405/4 (Andok. 1.78) to show idea quite similar to the 
reconciliation reported in Ath. Pol. 39.5. Whoever has punished with exile for 
committing homicide the Areopagos, the Ephetai, the Prytaneion or the Delphinion, 
shalI excluded from to retum to Athens.27 In this list the PalIadion 
(disregarding the insignificant Phreatto) is missing-properly, as we will see. Indicated 
the cr<paYEvcrtV, offenders who had kiBed their own hands shaB excluded 
from amnesty. These offenders are to tried the Areopagos, or, if pleading lawful 
killing, at the Delphinion (the Prytaneion ignored here). So the PalIadion would 
competent only for cases of indirect killing. idea that jurisdiction of the different 
courts had dependent the issue of premeditation certainly ruled out here. 
PossibIy both provisions amnesty express certain feeling of religious 
aversion against the social reintegration of citizen with "unclean" hands (cf. Ant. 5.11). 
who had raised his own hand against the victim, who is "unclean" only "in his 
soul" (Plat. Nom. see sec. 11), apparently could accepted more easily. 
Plato a1lows him to buried in home ·soil. It is welI known how deeply Athenian 
homicide law is rooted in the religious sphere. So the distinction should offer 
murder." 
25 
26 
For the problems with the texl, see Rhodes 468, Chambers 318. 
Clearly recognizcd Loening 40; his argumen! in is still based "premedilated 
27 Andok. 1.78: ... i:v 111] EvBOOE (orc;.';) 
'APELO" ,; ,; ,; ,; 
q>ov'1' q>"yiJ, ,; ,; ,; ... according 10 
(1962), who in his commentary (118) poinlS the parallels with Solon's amnes!y decree (Plu!. So/. 19.4). 
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sufficient reasons for accusing offenders who had acted directly and those otherwise 
involved before different courts of justice. 
4) Consequently, the amnesty did apply to indirect offenders- whose cases, to 
mind, belonged 10 the Palladion. This is proved the last of the passages to 
reviewed, the case of Meletos in Andokides' speech the Mysteries (1 .94), held in the 
autumn of 400 order of the Thirty (Tyrants), Meletos had certain Leon 
executed procedure of apagoge, but, as we are 1Old, at the time he could not 
prosecuted for homicide, in spite of law ordaining same treatment for planning and 
committing homicide 's own hand: 'tov Ev 'ti!> o:1>'ti!> EvExw8o:t 1Co:l 
'tov XEtpl Obviously, Andok:ides does not dare 10 claim that this clause 
is directly applicable to Meletos; explicitly, he only says that Mele10s at the time could 
not prosecuted more way of otlC11 <pOVO\J, due to the amnesty for offenses 
committed before year 403/2 Therefore, to determine the scope of application of 
that law, has to rely assumptions. Nowhere in homicide law does killing with or 
without one's own hands result in different sanctions. Penalties being imposed in 
homicide trials depend the perpetrator's guilt. The recently proposed view that 
law quoted had ordained same punishment for indirect killing and for killing one's 
own hands,28 is without foundation. It would much more reasonable 10 regard this 
provision, too, as jurisdiction clause:29 The indirect offender is to tried before the 
same court as the who has committed homicide with his own hands-on the 
Areopagos, in opinion. 
This provision, however, means could applied generally. It would have 
virtually deprived the Palladion of its judicial competence at Most probably, it was 
confined to certain category of cases. Without such restriction the law quoted 
Andokides would contradict the amnesty regulations of Ath. Pol. 39.5. If offenders who 
acted indirectly in general had faced the same legal consequences as those who 
committed homicide with their own hands, 1 see reason why they should not have 
excluded from amnesty. Yet Meletos, according 10 Andokides' evidence, 
doubtless did benefit from the amnesty regulations. This observation, regardless of 
discussion of the judicial competence of the criminal courts, also leads 10 the result that 
the law quoted Andokides might not have generally applicable to each and every 
case of indirect offense.30 Cmying out killing not one's own hands, but 
all pertains to special group of persons, magistrates of the polis.31 
28 So expliciUy (1963) 66. Wallace 101. 
29 Already Lipsius 125 has related the law "the same forum"; similarily Gagarin (1980) 93-
98: "according rule as old as the legal including the court and the penalty. was the 
same for the planner as for the actual killer." What Gagarin fails realize is that Andokides is quoting the 
law in close connectiOll with the amnesty; we shall back this matter immediately. 
30 MacDowell (1962) though pondering how combinc the law cited Andokides with 
the amnesty. is no! aware of the basic contradictiOll: Why should Andokides in this context quote law that 
was not even in the least applicable? 
3 1 Loening 72 is right in pointing out that 403/2 the main perpetra!Ors hardly could 
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jurisdiction clause ordaining the same treatment for and for those who committed 
homicide their own hands would make good sense. Restricted those cases the law, 
consequently, provided that magistrates who had ordered the killing of citizen were 
accused before the Areopagos, though had raised their own hands 
against the victim. Cases of indirect k.illing under officia1 authority were 
most qua1ified and best reputed court of justice.32 This specia1 jurisdiction clause inferred 
from the amnesty regulations and from Andok. 1.94 probably could have the reason 
why, after 403/2 severa1 cases were tried Areopagos that otherwise should 
have sent the Pa11adion because of the factor /30'UA.EUEtv of the deed.33 Also 
Harpokration's inconclusiveness which court was competent deal with cases of 
/30'UA.ruEtv,34 easily explained transfer of jurisdiction established especialJy 
for magistrates. 
In case, Meletos as private person was directly affected this 
provision. For the killing of those magistrates, after 403/2 were liable 
who had ordered his arrest and execution; only they- but Meletos---could held 
responsible as regard1ess of the amnesty. In 1.94 Andokides points 
that it was solely the amnesty that protected Meletos from homicide charges, 
Meletos' is calJed reprehensible35 and might, under certain circumstances, 
prosecuted (as every Athenian citizen was gather from the nomos 
incompletely quoted). In passage cited, Andokides chiefly deals with the scope of 
amnesty regulations, that is with the admissibility of certain law suits. focuses the 
prosecuted "killing with one's own hands," because "Cew the oligarchs are likely to have commilled 
homicide directly." 
32 The clause Aristot. A/h. 39.5 provided thal offenders with hands" 
were to excluded Crom the amnesly; so Ihe relalives Ihe killed could laler prosecule the 
perpetrators privale q>ovou. The following provision (A/h . 39.6) especially excluded from the 
amnesly the mOSI incriminaled oligarchic magistrales (the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, and the archons 
Piraeus). As they had commilled their killings nOI with their own hands, the law ciled in Andok. 
1.94 was necessary to enabIe the relatives the execuled to prosecute the 
despite the amneSly. The these cases justified devialion the conventional 
distribution compet.ence and assigned the decision 10. the Areopagos. 
33 The lexts have been thoroughly discussed Lipsius 125-127 and (1963) 65-69. 
Three cases remain probIematic. The flfSI Iwo deal with trials againsl oligarchic magistrales. The speaker 
Lysias 10 (held in 384/3 whose father had been put to death the Thirty (10.10), says he had 
"proceeded against the Thirty the Areopagos" (31). In Lys. 26 (de1ivered 382 Euandros, who had 
been selecled for as basi/eus, is altacked, because he had held under the Thirty and 
deserved to charged before the Areopagos himself (26.12) . The third case a1so regards magistrale, 
however one 1ater times. According 10 s.v. (loSI) speech Deinarchos 
against Pistias was held the Areopagos because From Dein. 1.53 Pistias is known as an 
Areopagite, viz. as Cormer magistrale (see 11823). Loening 69-84, though recognizing Ihe 
connect.ed with only gives the explanation thal "presiding magistrales and dikasleries 
were willing 10 contemplale less rigid inlerpretation direct homicide" (84). This is nOI quile 
conviocing. 
34 s.v. contrasts two losl speeches: the one Isaios againsl 
Eukleides, said to held the Palladion, and one Deinarchos againsl Pistias, the Areopagos 
the laner see n.33). lf the compet.ence the COUfl was nOI contest.ed, the speakers had reason 
to refer to this malt.er in their p1eadings. 
35 Andokides Cails to notice thal Meletos wou1d have risked his own liCe iC he had nOI obeyed 
the order the Thirty. Together with Meletos and another three citizens Sokrat.es had been delegaled to 
arreSI Leon. On1y Sokrales dared 10 withstand the Thirty (plato. 32c-d; see Loening 811) . 
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matter of judicial competence, not the possibly different sanctions for direct and 
indirect k.illing. 
FoHowing this outcome, the assumption that jurisdictional reform, as postulated 
Lipsius, took place in the founh century is rendered dispensabIe. Lipsius suggests that 
almost to the time when the Politeia was composed cases of intentional 
homicide were tried the Areopagos, inc1uding those of bouleusis of intentional 
homicide; then cases of Po'UA.WEtv, as Ath. Pol. 57.3 showed, were assigned exclusively 
to the Palladion.36 MacDoweH, however, regards those cases tried the Areopagos 
as cases of k.illing s own hand.37 For that reason, he states, those perpetrators had 
exc1uded from amnesty, with the judicial competence of the Areopagos being based 
the offender' s there was evidence for jurisdictiona1 reform. This latter 
argument is doubtless true. the homicide offenses should, in accordance with 
Lipsius, rather interpreted as acts of Po'UA.WEtv. Since the accused were magistrates, 
they within the scope of the 1aw quoted in Andok. 1.94. The killings they had 
inflicted were to treated as if "committed their own hands." For this reason- and 
not for the also implied-the Areopagos was the competent coun. 
IV. 
If interpretation of the five passages just reviewed is correct, combination of 
the various aspects will produce relatively simple and unsophisticated scheme: the 
Areopagos was the coun for cases of k.illing citizen with one's own hand, the Palladion 
for cases of indirect killing. The only exceptions to this rule were the cases of 
magistrates who had citizen put to death under official authority, i.e. who had acted 
indirectly: they feH, like cases of k.illing 's own hand, within the jurisdiction of the 
Areopagos. For cases of k.illing non-citizen, whether committed with one's own hand 
or not, the Palladion alone was competent. This simp1e principle that judicia1 
competence is allocated in accordance with the external facts of committing the deed 
apparently is determined re1igious aversion against hands. 
This religious attitude required, as far as bIood of member of the sacred community was 
concerned, specific oath-places, and this led to specific coun-sites accordingly. 
In lega1 practice this criterion was an extremely simple and convenient to 
apply. The p1aintiff' s charge indicated in which way the killing was perpetrated and 
determined decisively whether the case was to remitted to the Areopagos or to the 
PaHadion. The external facts of committing the crime-by one's own hand or in 
36 Lipsius 
37 MacDowell (1963) 66-68. Lys. 10.4,31 provides indication Cor kil1ing with one's own 
hands; the hands" Lys. 26.8, Cor which Euandros as magislI'ate under the Thirty wou1d deserve 
to tried the Areopagos (26.12), cou1d also in figurative sense Ant. 5.11, where all 
homicide oCCenders designated in this way). Improper1y, MacDowell puts the case Pistias aside (see 
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indirect way- made essential part of the plaintiff's The basileus 
formulated the oath according to the allegations submitted the plaintiff; in doing so he 
assigned the decision to of the two courts. The defendant had need 10 protest 
against his case being allocated 10 of the two courts. If charged with killing his 
own hand, the defendant could only make plea of lawful killing (in this case the 
Delphinion was competent), but he could not claim that he had acted indirectly. With 
punishment in both cases depending judgment the Palladion and the 
Areopagos resulted, as we shall see, in identical consequences anyway. 'In this situation, 
the accused could only deny having committed the deed at had 10 swear his 
di6mosia contrary 10 the plaintiff's and stand trial. Whether the decision was passed 
the Areopagos or the Palladion was of linle significance 10 him. 
If, however, the competence had dependent whether the plaintiff 
submitted charges of premeditated killing or not, essential point in dispute which only 
the court could decide would have raised in the preliminary stage. In this case, 
would have to grant the basileus the competence of deciding guilt already in 
preliminary proceedings.39 we have evidence of the basileus' authority reaching 
this far; in fact, tasks were 10 fix the date of the trial and to formulate the di6mosiai in 
accordance with the parties ' allegations. There is room for substantive decision. The 
second altemative, that the basileus determined the court according to the plaintiff's 
aHegation, with the jury, if appropriate, having 10 disclaim its competence during the 
trial, would means practicable.4o The application of the law in court-practice 
provides strong argument against the view that judicial competence of homicide courts 
should have dependent the issue of guilt. Assigning case 10 certain court was 
rather determined the uncomplicated criterion of whether the deed had 
committed "with one's own hand," "with one's own hand lawfully," or with 
one's own hand." 
In homicide trials the of killing seems 10 have consistently classified in10 
two different categories: the first aspect separated killing one's own hand from 
indirect acting; this issue, as shown determined the competent court, either the 
38 See Ant. 6.16 prosecution for non-citizen, which was to tried 
solely the Palladion, did not fail to perpetration one's own hand 59.10), probably 
for religious reasons. Only brief details are reported in Lys. 10.11 the contents of the 
39 Indeed, this conclusion is drawn Heitsch (1989) 86f, but the basis of what 1 think is 
wrong assumption: jurisdiction of homicide was, in his view, dependent the issue of guiIt. 
40 case related Aristotle (Eth. Mega/. 11 88b) is usually referred to in this context: 
accused woman was charged with of poison She denied intention to kill and 
declared she only wanted 10 administer love-philtre. She was acquitted the Areopagos. This court, in 
opinion, was competent solely because of 23.22). reach verdicI of guilty- with 
exile as sanction- il would have necessary for the plaintiff 10 classify his deed as 
jusI lilee the plainliff in AnL 6.19 did. As the court could only vote "yes" or homicide triaI being 
(see below the Areopagitai automatica1ly had to acquil the accused woman, if they 
denied her 1tpOvo.a. In so, the Areopagos means denied its competence-it rather rendered 
decision the merits. this passage see MacDowell (1963) 46f, Nl\rr(1983) 659 
Sealey 282, Heitsch (1989) 71f. 
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Areopagos or the PaHadion. Secondly, the plaintiff had to state whether the accused had 
k.illed with or without this issue was peninent to sentencing, either death or 
temporary exile. latter is to inferred from Dem. 21.43;41 Demosthenes repons 
difference in regard of sentencing, whether the Areopagos or the PaHadion is competent 
to render judgment. 
As far as we have knowledge of the mechanisms leading to judgment in Athenian 
legal procedures, the plaintiff had to summarize his petitio in single phrase. 
voting, the jury was only to or deny this phrase, leading directly to either 
condemnation or acquittal .42 In homicide law both the plaintiff's charge and the 
defendant's denial were expressed in the diomosiai. As shown Ant. 6 (3, 16), the 
decided simply voting the two contradictory oaths. Also from Ant. 6 (16,19) 
it inferred with vinual cenainty that the issue of was included in the 
wording of the diomosia, unless the plaintiff reproached the accused with this panicular 
item. If he did, however, charge the accused with the claimant and his 
witnesses, most probabIy, had to take an oath it- after the death penalty would 
dependent this special issue.43 
Reviewing sources, it should possibIe to find two proper examples of 
extremely situated cases in order to verify the doubIe classification of homicide offenses, 
first according to XEtpi or and subsequently (if required) according to 
case of unpremeditated k:illing committed with s own hands being tried 
the Areopagos, the hand, and case of indirect premeditated killing of 
citizen being tried at the PaHadion, the other, would provide corroborative suppon for 
the thesis just presented. Both cases would contradict the aHocation of jurisdiction as 
reponed Aristotle in his Athenaion Politeia (57.3). Moreover, the second case would 
require the Palladion to have competent to impose the death penalty. 
1) The fust case, the Areopagos trying unpremeditated killing committed with 
one's own hands, inferred only indirectly from Dem. 54.25, 28 .44 The speaker, 
41 21.43: . .. 0\ 
1)' aibloEroc; ICC/.' 
Similar ideas expressed in 23.49-50 (see below 1f in addition only the 
Areopagos had compelenl in cases of killing this certainly would mentioned 
as further argumenL 
42 Thtir (1987) 475f. 
43 Although nol expressed Arislotle's report, 1 would suggesl thal the diomosia 
the case of the "Iove-philtre (see did the perhaps the 
swore the woman was "guilly of homicide with the Complelely 
is how the accused forrnulated her dibmosia: Did she the 
or the ki11? Her fate this Did she 
the possibility of trial before the Areopagos, or did the acquiltal further charges? or 
did the acquiltal mean for her? 
44 54.25: <pOVO\J 
54.28: (the Areopagitai) iiv 
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Ariston, had beaten Ariston, however, does not charge with 
"wounding with the intent to but sues him only for "violent assault," means of 
(54.1). Had he died from the injuries, says, the case would have 
tried the Areopagos (28). These words exclude 1tp6vota as criterion for the 
judicial competence of the Areopagos. mind, it seems inadmissible in way to 
infer from this passage "that homicide was intentional whenever death resulted from 
act which was intended to cause harm."45 Interpreted this way, the passage certainly 
brought into accord with what we told in Ath. Pol. 57.3. solution to this 
rather would to acknowledge that the competence of the Areopagos is already 
based the fact of killing with one's own hands. Premeditation was relevant to this 
question. Unfortunately, the speaker fails to mention the penalties would have 
faced in case of being found guilty.46 
2) The second example to hypothesis should case of indirect but 
premeditated killing. This leads to the discussion before which court the first speech of 
Antiphon (Against the Stepmother) might have delivered. The accused woman is 
charged with poisoning her husband with the help of an-unaware-third person. The 
charge is of (1.26), committed (6, 22, 25); the punishment is 
death (27). The however, is addressed as the council the Areopagos 
would entitled,47 but merely (3,19,30). Formerly, scholars concluded from 
the factors of premeditation and the death penalty that the speech had held before 
the Areopagos.48 Recent studies , however, favour the Palladion as the appropriate 
They quite right in emphasizing as the criterion crucial for the 
judicial competence. Yet they comment neither the question of 1tp6vota the 
sanction, the death penalty.50 In view of. the further evidence, clear indication the 
double classification emerges: was pertinent to the competence of the 
Palladion, premeditation (as elsewhere; cf. Dem. 21.43) solely to sentencing, the death 
penalty. Therefore, to the impression gained Dem. 23.71-73, the death 
45 MacDowell (1963) 60. 
46 In probability, would risked banishment- the fale the "father Ihe priesless 
Brauron" had suffered. case reported in 54.25 classified withoul assuming several 
faclS omilled in the texl. Withoul raising his own hand, the had instigaled someone else to 
viClim who aflerwards died . Dealh was the penallY premeditaled killing. Sealey 280---without 
evidence-assumes the plainliff 10 have enforced the incompetenl court. According to 
Gagarin (1990) 97 and others, the defendanl volunlarily wenl into exile; the is 
inconsistenl with this view. Wallace 102 believes thal it was indeed the Areopagos thal imposed exile 
inst.ead death; in homicide proceedings, however, there is Entire1y wrong is 
(1963) 68 when inlerpreting the charge as Is il certain thal we 
dealing with homicide trial? The relatives, could have direcled the against the 
aClual offender; the priesless' father, however, could have tried the Areopagos religious 
sacrilege. Bul this assumption, 100, substantia1 evidence is missing . Anyway, this case shou1d 
excluded our f urther discussion. 
47 See Wallace 101 and 104. 
48 Lipsius 126, L. Gemel, Antiphon (1965) Heitseh (1984) 24 Gagarin (1990) 94. 
49 MacDowell (1963) 62-64 and 66, Wallace 101 
50 MacDowell (1963) omils I evidence Ihe allegedly crucial Ihe 
Areopagos. 
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penalty could well imposed the Palladion. 
VI. 
At this point general objection expected: double classification of the 
homicide act would unnecessary juristic complication of what had seemed to 
clear and simple matter so What should have led Athenians to create such 
sophisticated system for their homicide trials? Two arguments provide some reasons to 
reject such an objection. First of all, "double classification" resolves all those problems 
caused taking as criterion for the competence of the couns. Athenian 
homicide proceedings unnecessarily sophisticated only if the council of the 
Areopagos appointed basileus had to decide single vote both the issue of fact 
and question of the latter being the crucial factor for determining its own 
competence. from that, the double classification fits excellently the picture given 
the outlines of historical development- with due caution in respect to cenain 
details: 51 
Presumably, Drakon did ordain different consequences premeditated and 
unpremeditated killing; exile was only different oath- and coun-places 
cases of killing one' s own hand and one's own hand have existed the 
Areios Pagos52 and Palladion, the sanctuary of Pallas Athene. the panels 
both sites supposedly were made 51 Ephetai. later reform jurisdiction 
cases of killing one's own hand was shifted to the entire council meeting the 
Areios Pagos and (probably simultaneously) the death penalty as sanction to 
executed official authorities was introduced into Athenian homicide law: he who has 
killed is to executed if convicted the exile, however, remained 
the punishment for unpremeditated killing. 
Considering the allocation of competence to the various homicide couns rooted in 
religious attitude towards hands" as former stage, and recognizing the death 
penalty dependenl as result of later judicial reform, would provide 
historical explanation for the double classification proved the classical sources: an 
archaic, sacred system of jurisdiction found unalterable and indispensable was updated 
adding "modem" system of sanctions onlO the "old-fashioned" framework. 
VII. 
subject of this study, however, is the hislory of Athenian homicide law in 
diachronic view, the legal order as it emerges from the sources of Ihe time of the 
orators. Our reasoning so far raises the question of what value single source have 
for studying Athenian law. How far we trust general statements? general 
51 
52 
thc [ollowing scc (1990) 155[. 
See above 
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statement contradicting certain known relevant details and causing results inconsistent 
with the set of procedural institutions must regarded with suspicion. In such cases we 
should try to correct principle inconsistent with legal practice combining numerous 
details of information. This is the approach 1 have tried to pursue. The conclusion drawn 
from 23.65-73 and Arist. Ath. Pol. 57.3 stating the competence of the Areopagos as 
dependent 1tPOVOt<l, surely maintained. The criterion is rather based the 
way the deed was committed, i.e. the fact of k.illing XEtpi. 
Looking back to the results gathered so far calls for another serious investigation 
into the value of general statements. Their alleged general scope is either to restricted 
their specific context, or- as ratio--we must admit that seemingly welJ-
informed author to some extent, report incorrectly Athenian law. 
1) The information Demosthenes supplies in his speech Against Aristokrates (23) 
misleading, albeit certainly wrong. Properly viewed, the report of sections 
65-73 without further difficulties, found to consistent with the results 
presented The speech was delivered certain Euthykles in ypa<pi] 
Euthyk1es is accusing Aristokrates for public decree that the latter had 
proposed in favour of the mercenary commander Charidemos (91): whoever kills 
Charidemos shalJ (subject to apag6ge). In 19-87 the speaker tries to show 
that the decree contravened provisions of the existing homicide law (which makes 
the text important evidence for our subject means being free from 
tendentiousness); neither the different sanctions normally provided for 
homicide nor certain guarantees for fair trial were ensured.54 Remarkably, the speaker 
in 49-50 does mention but in context with the competence of the 
Areopagos, only in connection \vith certain further regulations that link premeditation 
with more severe punishment.55 
Demosthenes, describing the five Athenian homicide courts (65-79), focused 
procedural guaranties. Since the preconditions required for this purpose 
pleadings, voting) do differ between the Areopagos and the PaHadion (70), 
Demosthenes especially emphasizes the different sanctions he aHeges the two courts 
would impose. somewhat delicate formulation he assigns the death penalty to the 
Areopagos (69) and banishment to the PalJadion (72). In doing so he aHudes to the 
opposition / mentioned already in 50, now adding some filrther 
explanations. As we have seen, however, either of the two courts was of 
imposing both sanctions.56 Demosthenes, therefore, must have assigned the sanctions 
arbitrarily in order to present most vivid picture of both the procedural and 
the different sanctions. 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Wolff 5Off; Norr (1986) 65f. 
Koch 554f makes clear Lhat DemosLhenes' arguments are not always compelling. 
Cf. 21.43 
See 
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As the only legal criterion for separating the two courts (71, 72) 
is mentioned. The criterion which is definitely pertinent 10 the competence 
of the Palladion, is completely concealed. Understandably, he also fails to indicate 
"commission one' s own hand" as relevant to the entire passage (65-
70) does not mention certainly not without intent. For 
reasons of rhe10rical composing Demosthenes ranked the matter of sanctions higher than 
the issue of competence. thought of double classification required homicide 
proceedings would only have complicated unnecessarily his line of reasoning. In order 10 
praise the prevailing provisions there was need to list every detail of jurisdiction 
homicide scrupulously. Demosthenes has chosen deliberately, but without explicit1y 
forging. The passage homicide courts is piece of "Weltliteratur," yet not of the 
juristic 
2) The sober book the "Athenian State" is, from its beginning, confined 10 an 
account of the competence of the Archons and the courts. What Demosthenes suggests 
for rhetorical purpose now appears as report Athenian jurisdictional organization. 
Apparently, Aris10tle had used Demosthenes ' speech- as far as basic ideas are 
concemed- as guideline for the truly sophisticated Athenian homicide law which was 
sometimes confusing for the Athenians themselves; special board of exegetai was 
necessary 10 supply information certain cases of doubt (Dem. 47 .68). It is 
understandable that the philosopher was more attracted the issue of will than 
questions of archaic criteria for committing crime "with one' s own hands. " In legal 
practice, however, the system of court procedures could never have worked in the way 
that Aristotle (Ath . Pol. 57.3) has distributed jurisdiction to the Areopagos and the 
Palladion respectively. Perhaps unintentionally, Aristotle himself, in Ath. Pol. 35.5, 
presents the key 10 workable system of allocating competence when he quotes the 
arnnesty regulations. Not J.l.Ev a1to1C'tetvll il (Ath. Pol. 57.3), but 
ei 'ttVCl. il (Ath . Pol. 33.5) is what properly deterrnines 
the competence of the Areopagos. Supported numerous further indications the official 
document from 403 regarded as an authentic interpretation of law possibly 
derived from the time of Solon:57 . . . <pOVOU 
(Dem. 23.22). 
Finally, the following conclusions the positive law of Athens at the time of the 
ora1Ors are 10 drawn. Regarding the killing of Athenian citizen, the Areopagos is 
competent for cases of homicide committed one's own hand, the Palladion for those 
of indirect killing. In both cases the criterion of premeditation is pertinent only 10 the 
sanctions inf1icted verdict of guilty. 
57 Thiir (1990) 153. 
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NOTE58 
It is not surprising to find outstanding in Athenian homicide law 
keeping to view taken over preceding scholars without funher questions. 
Methodologically, two approaches to this subject situated between juristic and historic 
scholarship competing. The one-in p:>sitivistic way-sticks strictly to philological 
terms: ancient evidence is confined to its direct literal wording, with its range kept as 
narrow as possible and its deeper meaning disputed. As as real-historic problems 
concemed, this method seems to work; however, juristic issues are involved, it 
comes to its limits very soon. The other method is trying to understand ancient 
testimonia within their entire juristic circumstances: actually, the same texts are studied, 
they are brought into context with funher material that even related 
first glance. Sometimes, supponers of this way of approach seem 10 inlo conflicl 
with cenain statements of classical authors. 
The crucial question of present matter is to explain !he meaning of the 
opposition a\J't6XEtp / Taking this distinction as "recognized aspect" of 
Athenian homicide law, as respondent Wallace suggests, is satisfying all . Not 
single author has reponed concrete consequences this division had Athens' legal 
practice. Strangely enough, scholar has found it necessary so far to admit that the 
positive evidence is means sufficient gathering the proper sense of this explicit 
division. 
For that reason, either of the objections against four passages "killing 
one's own hand" have, itself, cenain measure of probability. such 
objections fade in overall view. The composition of Plato's provides 
splendid opponunity for vivid dispute: as for killing, we find several degrees of guilt and 
two different ways of commitment; which is fundamental division, which 
subdivision? Wallace corrects proposing to stan off with If 
we, however, begin with we will find five Ei'o" of homicide offenders, each of 
which into two Ot<X ... ... This could 
easily tantamount to av't6XEtp and Inferred from this phrase, the extemal 
way of committing homicide seems to the fundamental criterion. 
ln juristic discussions , usually the most compelling arguments drawn 
borderline cases. They allow to test how principle sustains. Wallace has 
enriched modest nevenheless significant collection two examples: 
21 .71-75 and Aristoph. Fr. 585. Actually, neither of the two counts in his favour. 
1) According to the of Demosthenes (21 .71) Euaion had killed his 
drinking-mate Boiotos in " self-defense." was convicted, however majority of 
58 In reply to Wallace's Response, which Collows. 
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only vote. Before which Gagarin suggests59 before the Areopagos due 10 
" intentional homicide." The jurors being called 8t1C(XO't(Xt leads Wallace to assuming the 
Palladion; 1tpOvota. cenainly is involved in this case. Two reasons, however, make it 
more probable to presume it was the Areopagos. jurors here are addressed 
directly, only described in pursuit of their duty. we 
or, more precisely, oi. but, as in Ant. 5.11, rather the term 8t1C(XO't(Xt. Even 
more imporlant, however, is another observation. Euaion gained this narrow vote 
without crying or begging (21 .75). In fact, this does not indicate self-restraint 
Euaion's side; panicularly the Areopagos such digressions of defendant were 
generally prohibited (Lys. 3.46; cf. also Lyk. 1.12f., Arist. Rhet. 1.1.5, contrary 
10 the Palladion (cf. MacDowell [1963] 93). 
2) However tempting the fragment from Aristophanes (fr. 585) quoted 
MacDowell ([1963] 59) appear, proper conclusion inferred from it 
anyway. It is derived from Eustathios' the Odyssey (ed. Weigel). 
Eustathios remarks the OpVH; referring 10 (Pallas) Athene (1419.55) : 
a1C(J)v 1C'tEVOO 'tE1CVOV. 8' iJ1tE1CptV(X'tO. 1tap' 1t<l'tEP 
800EtC; m1C11v U1tE1CptVE'tO. 'tap', 1t<l'tEp). As shown the insenion U1t01CptvEtV 
the words have of their immediate context. We reconstruct from 
this Byzantine source what the point of the joke was. Announcing "unintended 
killing" have caused funher nonsense. It ruled that only the authority 
of the Politeia has led to direct linking of the two verses. 
After all, sound and solid case contradicting hypothesis has found 
yet: nil obstat. 
59 Gagarin (1978),112,120. 
